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DETERMINATIVE AUTHQRICCX
The constitutional provisions,, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
1

are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the failure of appointed trial counsel to
object to the State's presentation of evidence of Defendant's
other crimes, wrongs or acts.

These failures precluded Defendant

of a fair trial.
The State charged Mr. Silva with Aggravated Assault, a thirddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103.

On

April 25, 2005, Mr. Silva appeared before the district court and
pleaded not guilty.
Mr. Silva appeared for a jury trial on May 25, 2005.

Upon

the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. Silva as charged.
At the sentencing hearing on July 26, 2005, the trial court
first took Mr. Silva's guilty plea in State

v. Silva,

Case No.

051700983, during which Mr. Silva pleaded guilty to one court of
witness tampering, a third degree felony.

The trial court then

sentenced Mr. Silva to two indeterminate terms "of zero to five
years"

for

aggravated

assault

and

witness

tampering

to

run

concurrent.
On August 25, 2005, Mr. Silva, through appointed appellate
counsel, filed Notice of Appeal

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Silva was charged with Aggravated Assault, a third-

degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (R. 1-2).
See

Information, R. 1-2, a true and correct copy of which is

attached hereto as Addendum A.
2.

On

April

25,

2005,

Mr.

Silva

appeared

before

the

district court and pleaded not guilty (R. 9-10) .
3.

Mr. Silva appeared for a jury trial on May 25, 2005 (R.

30-32) .
4.

After jury selection, in the course of handling various

matters, Mr. Silva's appointed trial counsel alerted the trial
court about the following:
MR. PETERSON:

I just wanted to make sure the Court and
Mr. Poll was [sic] aware of that. The
second issue I have is that we've gone
to fairly significant lengths to insure
Mr. Silva is presentable and that the
jury in [sic] aware that he is at the
jail or incarcerated at this time. Mr.
Poll indicated when he stated who his
witnesses are and I didn't want to jump
up right then and make matters worse
that one of his witnesses was someone
that worked at the Davis County Jail. I
think when he's called, it ought to be
in context that he's a Davis County
Deputy Sheriff and not a jailer and I
think we can work through the semantics
at that point in time if he needs to be
called at all.

THE COURT:

I'd agree with that.

3

(R. 124:44-45).

After further discussion of the matter, the trial

court advised the parties to instruct their witnesses unot to say
anything about incarceration." (R. 124:46:13-15).
5.

At trial, the State, as part of its case in chief,

called Mr. Denny Bassett as a witness (R. 124:88:20).
6.

During

the course of

the direct

examination of Mr.

Bassett, the State elicited the following testimony:
THE STATE:

I asked you earlier if you had talked to
[Mr. Silva] and how did you know that
you were talking to him?

MR, BASSETTJ

I heard the answer machine say, "Collect
call from Boston, or Joey Silva" or it
would say "Boston Paul" whatever but it
says that out loud like it's a machine
so . . ."

THE STATE:

And what did he say on the phone?

MR, BASSETTJ

On the phone?
We'd screen the calls
like that 'cause there's a couple of
people that would call from the county
jail.
When they'd pick up when I'd
start talking.

THE STATE:

When you got on the phone what did he
say?

MR, BASSETTi

He's say like "What's up, fucker?" And
I'm like, nothing.
I don't really
remember much of the rest of the
conversation besides he was like what's
going on like a lame day and he was like
he said he talked to his attorney and if
I didn't go that he'd be set free.

MR, PETERSON:

Objection, non-responsive.

4

THE STATE:

I specifically asked him -

THE COURT:

I'll overrule the objection.
continued [sic].

THE STATE:

If you didn't go where?

MR. BASSETT:

To court he'd just be set free because
they needed to subpoena me for me to be
able to go to court.

You may

(R. 124:102-03).
7.

Defense counsel did not object to the incarceration or

witness tampering references.
8.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. Silva

as charged (R. 125:274:10-14; R. 84).
«

9.

At the sentencing hearing on July 26, 2005, the trial

court first took Mr. Silva's guilty plea in State

v.

Silva,

Case

No. 051700983, during which Mr. Silva pleaded guilty to one court
of witness tampering, a third degree felony
Thereafter,

the

trial

court

sentenced

(07/26/05:28-31).

Mr.

Silva

to

two

indeterminate terms "of zero to five years" for aggravated assault
and witness tampering to run concurrent (07/26/05:33:7-12).

See

Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 99-101, a true and correct copy
of which is attached hereto as Addendum B.
10.

On

August

25,

2 0 05,

Mr.

Silva,

through

appellate counsel, filed Notice of Appeal (R. 103-06) .
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appointed

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
1.

Appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Silva of his Sixth

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing
to object to evidence of Mr. Silva's other crimes, wrongs or acts.
Appointed

trial

counsel's

failure

to

object

to

the

State's

presentation of evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration and the
alleged witness tampering fell below an objective standard of
reasonable

professional

judgment.

This

is

demonstrated

by

existing Utah case law and the underlying factual circumstances of
this case.

But for counsel's unprofessional errors of failing to

object to the evidence of Mr. Silva's other crimes or wrong acts,
the result at trial would have been different.

ARGUMENTS
I.

APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. SILVA OF HIS
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS•

In Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052

(1984), The United States Supreme Court, established a two-prong
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to
effective assistance of counsel has been denied.

x

Id.

at 687, 104

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
6

S.Ct. at 2 064.

According to this test, which was adopted by Utah

courts, a defendant must show "first, that his counsel rendered a
deficient

performance

performance
professional

fell

in

below

judgment

an

1995); State

v.

v.

demonstrable

objective

manner,

standard

of

and, second, that counsel's

prejudiced the defendant."
(Utah 1988); State

some

Perry,

Wright,

Bundy

v. Deland,

which

reasonable
performance

763 P. 2d 803, 805

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App.

893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

" [T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized
not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case,
Lockhart

a fair sentencing.

v.

Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369, 113

S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993).
In order to satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant
must

ux

identify

the

acts

or

omissions'

which,

under

the

circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.'"

State

P,2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland,

v.

Templin,

805

466 U.S. at 690,

688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).

Moreover, a

defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment."
cert, denied,

State

v.

Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989),

497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).

7

To demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of the test,
a

defendant

must

proffer

reasonable probability

sufficient

that, but

evidence

for counsel's

to

support

"a

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

at 187.

805 P.2d

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
Strickland,

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons
1994); State v. Frame,
A.

v. Barnes,

466 U.S. at

871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).

Legal Principles Governing the Admissibility
of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts

A person, as a fundamental principle of law, may be convicted
criminally only for his or her acts and not for his or her general
character.
w

State

v. Saunders,

1999 UT 59, fl5, 992 P.2d 951.

[I]f a conviction is based on an inference that [the] conviction

is justified because of the defendant's criminal character or
propensity to commit bad acts", this fundamental principle is
violated.

Jd.

"The admission of evidence of prior crimes may

have such a powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to
subvert

the constitutional

principle

that

a defendant

may be

convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific
crime charged."

Jd. (citing In re

S.Ct. 1068 (1970)).

Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364, 90

The law, consequently, has long prohibited

8

the

admission

of

prior

crime

evidence

unless

the

proffered

evidence is probative of an issue other than criminal propensity
Id.

or character and is not unduly prejudicial.
limiting

the

admissibility

of

evidence

of

prior

"The rule
crimes,

as

presently stated in rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, has
existed for almost a century in this state."
omitted).

Id.

(string citation

Although the Utah Supreme Court, in State

v.

Decorso,

1999 UT 57, H1J12-35, 993 P.2d 837, addressed and limited prior
statements of the rule articulated in State

v.

Doporto,

935 P. 2d

484 (Utah 1997), "the basic concepts embodied in the rule limiting
the use of prior crime evidence remain intact."
B.

Id.

Rule 404(b) Analysis of Admissibility

Utah Rule of Evidence 404 (b), which governs the admissibility
of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts, provides that
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.
It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity,
intent,
preparation,
plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident . . . .
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).

Before deciding whether evidence of other

crimes, wrongs or bad acts is admissible under Rule 404(b), "the
trial court must determine
offered

(1) whether such evidence is being

for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b),

9

(2)

whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3)
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403."
v.

Nelson-Waggoner,

Decorso,

2000 UT 59, fl6, 6 P.3d 1120 (citing State

State
v.

1999 UT 57, 1(21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837).

"A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 404(b) is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard."
2005 UT 11, Hl5, 108 P.3d 730; State v. Bluff,
P. 3d

1210

(citing

Decorso,

1999

UT

57

State

v.

Allen,

2002 UT 66, ^56, 52
at

fl8) .

However,

"admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously
examined

by

discretion."

trial

judges

Decorso,

in

the

proper

exercise

of

that

1999 UT 57 at i|l8 (citation omitted).

After jury selection in the case at bar, in the course of
handling various matters, Mr. Silva's appointed trial counsel
alerted the trial court about the following:
MR. PETERSON:

I just wanted to make sure the Court and
Mr. Poll was [sic] aware of that. The
second issue I have is that we've gone
to fairly significant lengths to insure
Mr. Silva is presentable and that the
jury in [sic] aware that he is at the
jail or incarcerated at this time. Mr.
Poll indicated when he stated who his
witnesses are and I didn't want to jump
up right then and make matters worse
that one of his witnesses was someone
that worked at the Davis County Jail. I
think when he's called, it ought to be
in context that he's a Davis County
Deputy Sheriff and not a jailer and I
think we can work through the semantics

10

at that point in time if he needs to be
called at all.
THE COURT:
(R. 124:44-45).

I'd agree with that.

Following a discussion of the matter, the trial

court advised the parties to instruct their witnesses "not to say
anything about incarceration." (R. 124:46:13-15).
In the instant case, the State, during the direct examination
of Mr. Denny Bassett, wrongfully and needlessly elicited evidence
of Mr. Silva's incarceration and of witness tampering allegations.
By way

of

its direct

examination

of Mr. Bassett,

the

State

elicited the following testimonial evidence:
THE STATE:

I asked you earlier if you had talked to
[Mr. Silva] and how did you know that
you were talking to him?

MR. BASSETT:

I heard the answer machine say, "Collect
call from Boston, or Joey Silva" or it
would say "Boston Paul" whatever but it
says that out loud like it's a machine
so . . ."

THE STATE:

And what did he say on the phone?

MR. BASSETTJ

On the phone?
We'd screen
the
calls
like
that
'cause there's
a couple of
people that would call from the county
jail.
When they'd pick up when
start talking.

I'd

THE STATE:

When you got on the phone what did he
say?

MR. BASSETT:

He's say like "What's up, fucker?" And
I'm like, nothing.
I don't really
remember much of the rest of the
11

conversation besides he was like what's
going on like a lame day and he was
like

he said he talked to his attorney and if
I didn't go that he'd be set
free.
MR. PETERSON:

Objection, non-responsive.

THE STATE:

I specifically asked him -

THE COURT:

I'll overrule the objection.
continued [sic].

THE STATE:

If you didn't go where?

MR. BASSETT:

To court he'd just be set free because
they needed to subpoena me for me to be
able to go to court.2

(R. 124:102-03) (Emphasis added).

You may

Appointed trial counsel did not

object to the incarceration or witness tampering references.
Appointed trial counsel's failure to object to the State's
presentation of evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration or alleged
witness tampering fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment.

This is demonstrated by existing Utah case

law and the underlying factual circumstances of this case.
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to object
to the evidence of Mr. Silva's other crimes or wrong acts, namely,
his incarceration and alleged witness tampering, the result at
trial would have been different.
objected,

the

trial

court,

Had appointed trial counsel

under

2

the

first

part

of

the

A true and correct copy of the transcript containing
testimony of Mr. Bassett is attached hereto as Addendum C.
12

the

aforementioned
discretion

test

had

incarceration.

of

it

admissibility,

admitted

the

would

evidence

have
of

abused
Mr.

its

Silva's

The same analysis applies to Mr. Silva's alleged

witness tampering.
Further, the record demonstrates that evidence of Mr. Silva's
incarceration or alleged witness tampering was not offered for a
non-character purpose.

The evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration

or alleged witness tampering does not satisfy the requirements of
Utah Rule of Evidence 402.3
The record demonstrates that the evidence of Mr. Silva's
incarceration

and

alleged

witness

tampering

was

probative of any material fact to the crimes charged.

less

than

Other than

propensity to commit the crime, evidence of Mr. Silva's prior
incarceration or the alleged witness tampering did not tend to
prove a material fact of the crimes charged.
Finally, had appointed trial counsel objected, the trial
court would have erred if it had concluded that the evidence of
Mr. Silva's incarceration or the alleged witness tampering met the
3

According to Rule 402, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not
admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. u'Relevant evidence' means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401.
"Other crime evidence is admissible if it 'tends to prove some fact
that is material to the crime charged--other than the defendant's
propensity to commit crime.'" State
v. Bluff,
2002 UT 66 at ^f56, 52
P.3d 1210.
13

requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
v.

Shickles,

760 P.2d 291

In

State

(Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
In deciding whether the danger of unfair
prejudice
and
the
like
substantially
outweighs the incremental probative value, a
variety of matters must be considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to
the commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval
of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of
alternative proof, and the degree to which
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.
Id.

at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick

Utah R. Evid. 403.4

565 (3d ed. 1984)); see also
which

the evidence

of Mr.

on Evidence

Silva's

§ 190, at

The manner in

incarceration

and

alleged

witness tampering were presented at trial increased the likelihood
that

the

jury would

and did

convict

Mr. Silva based

on his

criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts.
The

need

for

the

evidence

nonexistent, in the instant case.
Silva's

incarceration

and

the

was

extremely

low,

if

not

In short, the evidence of Mr.

alleged

witness

tampering

was

unnecessary to the State's case, especially when considered in

4

Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
"Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
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light of the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading

the jury based

solely on Mr. Silva's

character or propensity to commit bad acts.

criminal

Moreover, in light of

the factual circumstances of the case and the evidence presented
at trial, the evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration or the alleged
witness tampering was unnecessary
trial.
denied,

See State

v. Wood,

to the defense utilized at

648 P.2d

71, 89-90

(Utah), cert.

459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-

306.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Silva respectfully requests that
this Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the
district court for a new trial and for any further proceedings or
relief consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in
its opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of^April, 2006.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this 6th day of
April, 2006:
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake C>C9>vUX 94114-0854
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MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P.O.Box618
800 West State Street
FarmingtonUT 84025
Telephone: (801)451-4300
Fax:
(801)451-4328
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOEY L. SILVA
DOB: 04/08/1968,
Defendant.

Bail:
INFORMATION
Case No.

OTN17056409

QfRB

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant,
either directly or as a party, on or about April 08, 2005 at County of Davis, State of Utah,
committed the crime of:
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, (137) 76-5-103 UCA, third degree felony, as
follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did commit assault as defined in
Utah Code § 76-5-102 and used a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
This Information is based on evidence obtained from witness Brody Warren.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Brody
Warren of the Clearfield Police Department, and the information herein is based upon such
personal observations and investigation of said officer.
1. On April 8, 2005 defendant and several of his friends went to the home of the
victim. While at the home, afightbroke out between one of defendant's friends and the victim.
4/11/2005

information

2. As the fight was occurring, defendant grabbed a baseball bat and struck the
victim in the head and in the arm several times.
Authorized April 11, 2005
for presentment and filing:
MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney

Jeptity Davis^6^nt5^Attorney
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: MINUTES
: SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 051700577 FS

JOEY L SILVA,
Defendant,
Custody: Bail

Judge:
Date:

GLEN R. DAWSON
July 26, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
lanas
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SMITH, DEE W
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 8, 1968
Video
Tape Number:
7-26-05
Tape Count: 3:29
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CHARGES

£===

S

1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/25/2005 Guilty

*°-

8

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Case No: 051700577
Date:
Jul 26, 2005

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The term may run concurrent with any term now serving.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$9250.00
$0.00
$4263.51
$9250.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$9250.00
$0
$4263.51
$9250.00
Plus Interest
Fine payments are to be made to Board of Pardons Court.
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE DAVIS COUNTY TREASURER
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by 2nd District
Court-Farmington.
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Public Defender fee is to be sent to the Office of State Debt
Collection.

Case No: 051700577
Date:
Jul 26, 2005

Dated t h i s Q#*~day of

QoL.

, 20O3T".
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1

stating, implying that Mr. Silva made this statement.

2

don't think there's foundation to support that.

3

THE COURT:

4

foundation?

5

Q

I

Could you provide me some more

(BY MR. POLL)

I asked you earlier if you had

6

talked to him and how did you know that you were talking to

7

him?

8
9
10

A

I heard the answer machine say, "Collect call from

Boston, or Joey Silva" or it would say "Boston Paul" whatever
but it says that out loud like it's a machine so...

11

Q

And what did he say on the phone?

12

A

On the phone?

We'd screen the calls like that

13

^cause there's a couple of people that would call from the

14

county jail.

15

Q

When you got on the phone what did he say?

16

A

He was like "What's up, fucker?" And I'm like,

When they'd pick up when I'd start talking.

17

nothing.

I don't really remember much of the rest of the

18

conversation besides he was like what's going on like a lame

19

day and he was like he said he talked to his attorney and if

20

I didn't go that he'd be set free.

21

MR. PETERSON:

22

MR. POLL:

23

THE COURT:

24

continued.

25

Q

Objection, non-responsive.

I specifically asked him I'll overrule the objection.

(BY MR. POLL)

You may

If you didn't go where?
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1
2

A

To court he'd just be set free because they needed

to subpoena me for me to be able to go to court.

3

Q

Did he talk to you about you getting a subpoena?

4

A

Yeah, he asked if I had gotten a subpoena and I

5

said, no, that I hadn't been around my house or you know.

6

Q

What did he say about that?

7

A

That they needed to subpoena me and if they didn't

8

subpoena me, I'd be alright.

9

Q

Did he talk to you about your house and what to do?

10

A

I don't recollect.

11

Q

One second.

12
13

Did you tell him what you were going

to do until that time?
A

I just said don't worry about it, I'm not going to

14

court, that I wasn't going to do nothing.

15

like - like if they subpoenaed me then I would but I wasn't

16

going to sit there and just show up.

17
18

Q

Okay.

Did you tell him anything about what you

were going to do pending that subpoena coming?

19

A

Pending, like after?

20

Q

No, before it came.

21

going to do?

Did you tell him what you were

22

A

Hide out or something?

23

Q

Yeah, did you tell him that?

24

A

I don't remember.

25

I wasn't going to

I could have.

I was - like I

said, I was high a lot of the time and I...
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